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by Eduard H Hochreiter and David T Llewellyn
On October 24, 2003, SUERF celebrated its 40th anniversary in the Galerie
Dorée of the Banque de France with an especially high level and rich seminar.
The memorable occasion was further elevated by Jean Claude Trichet giving
the tenth SUERF Annual Lecture in his last public speech as Governor of the
Banque de France, prior to taking over as President of the European Central
Bank.
This study brings together in slightly edited form the four papers presented at
the seminar and the Annual Lecture. In combining these presentations in one
Study we also want to point to the breadth of SUERF’s academic and applied
activities over the forty years of SUERF’sexistence. It is also worth mentioning
that the speakers at the seminar not only held high offices for SUERF but they
also reflect the three pillars of SUERF’s constituencies, i.e., central bankers,
practitioners from the commercial financial sectors, and academics.
The past forty years have witnessed substantial changes in all aspects of
European and international finance with many changes in both the
international and domestic architecture and monetary regimes. The business
of banking and the operation of financial institutions and markets have also
changed beyond recognition. Jean-Paul Abraham’s monumental overview of
forty years of monetary and financial thinking in Europe as seen through
SUERF’s twenty-four Colloquia succinctly focuses on key monetary and
financial developments since the early 1960s. The author’s recollection of the
content of SUERF’s Colloquia during the last four decades therefore covers
pivotal events such as the demise of the Bretton Woods system in the first half
of the 1970s, the push for deregulation and liberalization of markets in the
1980s and the “making” of Economic and Monetary Union in the 1990s that
fundamentally changed Europe’s economic landscape. The 1990s also saw
the collapse of the centrally planned economic system and the reintegration
of the economies of central and eastern and Europe into the world economy
that culminates with their accession to the European Union in May 2004. As
Abraham points out it is specifically in the last decade that SUERF has
increasingly also focused on micro-financial issues such as risk management,
mergers and acquisitions and the like.
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been better chosen more timely. Just one month before the decision by
ECOFIN to suspend the excessive deficit procedure for France and Germany,
he convincingly argues the need for fiscal rules in EMU. Elaborating on the
dangers of free riding, moral hazard due to lack of credibility of the no bailout
clause contained in the Maastricht Treaty and an inefficiency of
market-imposed fiscal discipline, he supports rules along the lines of aStability
and Growth Pact. Bruni further argues for a radical reform of European fiscal
legislation including the establishment of a better-targeted quality of national
budgets and of an independent centralized agency for fiscal policy to overview
binding fiscal rules.
Alexandre Lamfalussy takes issue with the challenges facing the European
System of Central Banks in the light of financial market integration in Europe
and in the context of financial globalization. The author highlights and
assesses the current institutional arrangements in Europe. Currently the role
that central banks play in financial market supervision is in flux due to the
restructuring of the institutional set-up of financial market supervision in
Europe. In this regard he voices some concern because of the different
degrees of involvement of national central banks in operational supervision in
the euro area and its effect on the role to be played by the ECB. Yet, regardless
of the precise institutional set-up, he strongly argues that central banks need
to be involved in financial market supervision in one way or another because
of their core task to safeguard financial stability.
Robert Raymond takes a look at the state of affairs in European financial
market integration. In his paper he analyses the remaining obstacles for an
efficient European financial market, such as the heterogeneity of legal
frameworks in the euro area as well as the existence of a large number of
cross-border settlement systems. He also discusses the prevalent fears with
regard to consolidation of national supervisory and regulatory bodies. Two
recommendations emerge: First, the harmonization of legal provisions along
the lines suggested by the most recent Giovannini Report and second,
a consolidation of cross-border transfers of securities taking the existing US
architecture as an example.
A decisive analytical tool in assessing the benefits and costs of joining
a monetary union has been based on the “optimal currency area” (OCA)
approach pioneered by Robert Mundell. Recent developments of this theory
suggest that OCA criteria have to be seen also as endogenous. Besides, the
New Economic Geography (NEG) provides a relevant theoretical framework
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Jean-Claude Trichet combines these concepts to discuss the interrelationship
between OCA and economic policies in the euro area. His main contention is
to explain that EMU is a dynamic and not a static concept. In this context
Trichet sees the OCA properties of EMU shaped by endogenous forces
possibly leading to more (regional) specialization and to agglomeration of
activities benefiting to the most dynamic areas.. Trichet discusses risks and
opportunities arising from these dynamics. Monetary stability and beyond
macroeconomic stability constitute obviously the desirable background and
Trichet firmly believes in the need for fiscal rules along the stability and
growth pact for EMU to be sustainable in the long term. Furthermore Trichet
draws attention on the decisive part of well-designed structural policies to
fully benefit from the opportunities of NEG dynamics underpinning the
(endogenous) optimality of EMU. He stresses that this should gradually go
hand in hand with stronger European economic governance and in particular
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Thirty years ago, at the fourth SUERF Colloquium, held in Nottingham UK
in April 1973, a little incident occurred at the final speech, which included the
usual acknowledgements and thanks. Professor Wilson was giving that
speech as President of SUERF and Chairman of the Colloquium. He noted the
following about that session in the personal memoir he wrote twenty years
later, in November 1993. Speaking of Raymond Bertrand, a high-ranking
OECD official who was to become President of SUERF later on: “Bertrand
was annoyed that I spoke only in English and himself rose to declare (several
times): “Il faut dire ‘merci’ en français” (in bold in the text).
Dix ans après cette note, je tiens à compenser quelque peu cette omission tout
au début, non à la fin de mon exposé, en disant ‘merci’ en français plusieurs
fois (‘several times’) ou comme disent nos amis luxembourgeois ‘vielmals
merci’ :
● Merci au Conseil de la SUERF et tout spécialement à son actuel Président,
David Llewellyn, d’avoir, d’abord, accepté mon refus d’écrire l’histoire-
bataille de la SUERF, de m’avoir ensuite chargé d’explorer le
développement de la pensée monétaire et financière en Europe à travers
les Colloques et les Publications SUERF et surtout d’avoir continué à me
soutenir et à m’encourager au moment où des ennuis de santé m’incitaient
plutôt à considérer ce mandat comme un ‘cadeau empoisonné’;
● Merci au Secrétariat SUERF, en particulier l’infatigable Beatrix Krones,
à plusieurs membres du Conseil et aux amis à mon université et à la
Banque Nationale de Belgique, d’avoir plongé dans leurs archives et
bibliothèque personnelles et de leur institution, ce qui a permis de
reconstituer et de mettre à ma disposition une collection complète des
publications liées aux 24 Colloques;
● Merci à tous ceux et celles – en particulier les membres du Comité des
Publications SUERF – maintenant appelé Editorial Board – et son
Président Morten Balling, qui m’ont aidé avant, pendant et après la
rédaction du texte;
● Merci à ceux et celles, y compris mon épouse, qui ont tenté de ‘civiliser’
mon anglais, encore plus rugueux que mon français;
● Merci à toute l’équipe du Secrétariat à Vienne, qui, sous la direction de Edi
Hochreiter et de Beatrix Krones, a assuré la publication du texte en un
temps record, ainsi qu’à l’équipe de Dexia Banque Belgique, en particulier
Peter Van Dijcke, qui a transformé mon texte en une présentation en Power
Point:
11
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France, qui me permettent de présenter le travail dans le cadre prestigieux
de cette Galerie Dorée.
Shifting back to English and to a more down-to-earth level, I emphasise that,
of course, all the remaining errors are mine. Moreover, the whole study is not
the work of a professional historian. I have simply tried as an academic
economist and as an ex-banker to follow the development of monetary and
financial thinking in Europe since the Sixties, over four decades and
24 Colloquia, held in 16 different countries, as this development is evidenced
by 22 Colloquia-Books and 10 Colloquia-related brochures. Do not think that
I have read in detail each of the more than 8000 pages of the basic
documentation. I have concentrated on keynote addresses, the General
Reports, the Marjolin Lectures trying to ascertain the dominating themes in
each Colloquium. Then, I looked through the individual contributions,
neglecting statistics, techniques and mere descriptive information and
choosing representative quotations.
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The whole study is based on three organising principles, which I call my three
main assumptions. They explain the overall structure of my study and also
that of my presentation.
2.1. The dominant themes and the title of the colloquia have been determined
by the ‘force of events ‘more than by academic theories. This constitutes
the link between the topics and important events or major shifts in
policies and financial activity. It leads to a characterisation of the main
issues in five distinct periods marked out by major events or major shifts.
2.2. The contributions in each Colloquium Book are interesting not only for
what – the content – but also for who (the author) has said something and
for howthis has been said or written. This explains the structure of the study,
which comprises an important Anthology(Part 2), besides aSurvey(Part 1).
Part 2 can be called the SUERF Book of Quotations and constitutes the
documentary base of the study, organised in the chronological order of the
colloquia. I have insisted that the anthology should not be dealt with as an
annex to the survey. About two-thirds of my time went into composing the
anthology, which makes for 70% of the volume.
2.3.  The Survey should be based on a mix of a synchronic approach
emphasising the general mood (l’air du temps) in a given period and
a diachronic one, which focuses on developments and changes through
time. This explains the internal structure of the Survey. This oral
presentation concentrates on an analysis per period, according to the
synchronic approach in the survey and illustrated by some quotations, in
the original language, English or French.
For each period the presentation concentrates on three items:
– The stage: the major events, the colloquia, l’air du temps,
– The dominant themes and the outstanding contributions and their authors,
– An assessment of the contribution of the colloquia to the development of
monetary and financial thinking.
Let us now have a look at each period, linking monetary and financial
thinking to the major events and the discussions at the SUERF Colloquia.
13
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3.1. Period I: 1969- early 1974
April 1969 Tilburg The Future of the International Monetary
System
October 1970 Tarragona Monetary Policy and New Developments in
Banking
January 1972 Strasbourg Aspects of European Monetary Union
April 1973 Nottingham Multinational Enterprises – Financial and
Monetary Aspects
To  this period, I have given the rather dramatically sounding title of ‘The
demise of the Bretton Woods System.’All the Anciens here will remember the
atmosphere of strain, followed by shock at the formal announcement of the
inconvertibility of the $ by President Nixon on August 15, 1971 and ending
in desperate, but unsuccessful efforts to restore the old order at the
Smithsonian Conference, in December of the same year. In the European
Community, the Werner Plan was doomed to fail because it had been built on
what Gros and Thygesen called in their 1992 Survey ‘its implicit reliance on
the Bretton Woods System.’
In that period SUERF held four colloquia: Tilburg, Tarragona, Strasbourg and
Nottingham. Of course, the macro-economic issues in international and
European monetary relations dominated the scene.
Comparing the contributions to the 1969 meeting in Tilburg with those of
Strasbourg in 1972 suggests some kind of tragicomedy. The title of the former
was: The Future of the International Monetary System. Eventually, it was
a future that would never materialise: the ‘Future of the Past’. Discussions
were concentrating on a reform within the existing system while that system
was going to break down shortly afterwards.
This was already apparent in Strasbourg in January 1972. Louis Camu, the
highly esteemed President of the Banque de Bruxelles, opened the meeting by
linking the Nixon Declaration of 1971 with a Napoleon Decree of 1810 and
stating: “... Ce jour là ( i.e. the day after the Nixon words), nous avons appris
qu’une structure monétaire du monde avait vécu et s’il faut regarder cet
évènement, qu’il me soit permis de citer Sartre ‘avec des yeux réinventés’.”
14
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the US Balance of Payments financed by the rest of the world had come to an
end. His forecast has proved to be totally wrong. We still speak of the
American current deficit financed by the rest of the world.
However, what has proved completely right is the need and also the
opportunity to strengthen and accelerate the search for a specific European
monetary identity, for some kind of EMU, which would not have the defects
of the Werner Plan. The ideas about the concrete design of such EMU were
still far from clear and unanimous. There was the traditional opposition
between the so-called monetarists and economists and a common currency
seemed impossible without and before a political union.
In the Tilburg Colloquium Book and in the papers of the Strasbourg one, Ifound
two extensive academic contributions, which seem to have been forgotten in
most of the subsequent literature. At Tilburg, a then young professor at
Wisconsin State University, Robert W. Russell, presented a brilliant analysis of
the pressures on the existing Bretton Woods system and on the proposals of
reform. Eventually, it was an impressive synthesis of most of the discussions in
the Sixties, on the basis of five variables: freedom of international economic
relations, alterability of exchange rates, internationally accepted monetary
reserves, autonomous mechanisms of adjustment of balance of payments and,
finally, foreign holding of key currencies. He concluded that the most promising
changes would be to make exchange rates somewhat more flexible and to
activate the special Drawing Rights Arrangement of the IMF.
At Strasbourg, on the other side, Professor Onida, from the University of
Milan, criticised a mere theoretical architecture of EMU derived from the
literature on the optimum currency area. He also opposed an over-emphasis
on exchange rate stability in the sense of irreversible parity pegging,
a position typical of Italian thinking at that moment.
Retrospectively, the other issues discussed at the Colloquia of this period
remained on the sidelines of the central theme .May I just mention them
without much comment:
– the monetary aspects of the entry of the United Kingdom in the EEC
– particularly the future role of he pound sterling as a reserve currency,
– the relations and frequent tensions of multinational companies with
national state policies,
– the implications of various theories on the design of monetary policy.
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pre-Nixon literature felt like listening to an orchestra stoically playing on
a sinking ship, on a Titanic. On the contrary, reading the Strasbourg booklets
1972 was discovering an early landmark in the sequence of SUERF
Colloquia. There the breakdown of Bretton Woods spurred a new and
unavoidably imperfect search for European monetary identity.
3.2. Period II
September 1977 Wiesbaden: New Approaches in Monetary Policy
May 1979 Basle: Europe and the Dollar in the World-Wide
Disequilibrium
Roughly speaking; Period II covers the second half of the Seventies, from late
1974 till early 1979. It suffered from the aftermath of two oil shocks, from
a worldwide inflation disaster and from some resounding bank failures such
as that of the Herstatt Bankhaus in June 1974.It was a time of disarray, of
search and experiments for new monetary anchors and of stormy relations
between Europe and the dollar. But it was also the time when, amidst the
disarray and by trial and error, new theories, which previously were only
discussed in academic circles, penetrated into practical policymaking.
Four colloquia were held in this near-quinquennium: Venice, Brussels,
Wiesbaden and Basle.
Among the topics discussed, international monetary relations stayed at the
forefront. Two main issues emerged. Number one concerned the exchange
regime, in short the fixed-versus-floating exchange rate debate. Already in
Venice in 1974 previous expectations about floating exchange rates proved to
be an illusion. In the opinion of several Italian authors at that meeting no
system of exchange rates, either floating or fixed, could work well under the
pressure of the enormous oil deficits and worldwide inflation.
However, contrasting with what in Europe was called the benign neglect
policy of the American authorities, exchange rate stabilisation progressively
became a priority in Europe. This led, first, to – not very successful
– experiments with various kinds of SnakeArrangements. They had the merit
to be a training ground for launching, early in 1979, the European Monetary
System (EMS), whose mechanisms were analysed at the Basle Colloquium
1979 by one of its founding fathers, Jacques van Ypersele.
16 Surveying the Survey per Period
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role of the inconvertible but inescapable $? A typical statement by Henri
Bourguinat: ‘Une chose est de constater qu’il n’est plus qu’une monnaie de
second best, une autre de lui trouver un remplaçant: il n’en a point.’ The
prevailing view was that the dollar would remain the main intervention
currency, but would lose some of its reserve functions – which did not occur
to a significant degree, even after the launching of the euro.
Amidst exchange rate volatility and stormy relations between Europe and
the $, inflation rose everywhere, to even two-digit inflation rates in many
countries. Therefore, the focus in the colloquia shifted, at least partly, from
international to overall monetary policy, domestic and international. The
overriding question became: how to cope with what was called ‘The
World-wide Inflation Disaster’ by Irving Friedman, in a book that even
attracted the attention of the Encyclopaedia Britannica.
Already at the Venice Colloquium Rainer Masera had stressed the link
between exchange rate regimes and money creation. However, it was only at
the Wiesbaden Meeting in 1977 that overall monetarism penetrated and
dominated the discussions under the title ‘New Approaches in Monetary
Policy’. Apparently monetarism no longer was a mere topic of academic
analysis and debate, but had penetrated practical policy-making. The
dominant but not unanimous message was worded by Jacques Sijben in
a remarkable contribution linking theoretical basics and practical problems:
‘The post-war macro-economic stabilisation policy based on the Keynesian
analysis has not been successful in curbing the inflationary process during
the past decade...We cannot endorse the philosophy of ‘learning to live with
inflation’...The inflationary process is essentially a monetary phenomenon
which cannot come into effect unless the monetary authorities provide the
required ‘monetary fuel’...Wage negotiations and price-setting by firms
should not be determined by the rate of inflation in the recent past, but rather
by the lower rate of inflation, which will be allowed by monetary authorities
in the near future...’
In this context, much attention went to the Bundesbank as a reference for
a pragmatic quantitative approach to monetary policy, as described in
a contribution of Helmut Schlesinger, Member of the Vorstand.
International policy coordination as a matter of money supply policies and not
of exchange surveillance and intervention rules raised some controversy.
Surveying the Survey per Period 17
Suerf 2_2004  4.7.2004  17:53  Stránka 17Theo Peeters (University of Leuven) considered this kind of policy
coordination as a logical consequence of the monetarist approach, but Council
Member Niels Thygesen argued (I quote) ‘that without focus on some
declared objectives for exchange rates, clear guidelines for monetary policy
coordination were not feasible.’
Finally, exchange rate volatility and inflation had, of course, their impact on the
functioning of the financial markets and the management of individual financial
institutions .This was apparent at the 1976 Brussels Colloquium, where Roland
Vaubel brilliantly advocated ageneralised indexation of financial instruments. It
raised the objection that, if indexed financial tools may protect individual firms
and persons against inflation, they also help to institutionalise inflation and to
weaken the incentive to suppress inflationary pressures.
On the other hand, the uncertainties resulting from inflation and exchange
rates were reinforced by the repercussions of important bank failures. In
Brussels, it was emphasised that these repercussions could no longer be
considered as mere ‘accidents’, but were indicators of inadequate liquidity
and solvency in the banking sector. They pointed to the need to improve
national banking supervision and international coordination of national
supervision, a ‘chorus’ which will be heard in many subsequent colloquia.
In a global assessment, it should be repeated that macro-economic issues
continued to dominate the SUERF colloquia; with some shift from currencies
and exchange rates policy towards overall monetary policy, aiming at coping
with the inflation disaster. Developments at the level of markets and
individual institutions were also primarily analysed as being induced by
macro developments: exchange rate volatility and inflation.
I nominate the 1977 Wiesbaden Colloquium as the archetype of a good
SUERF Colloquium because of its combination of academic research,
monetary policy-making and practical targeting. I strongly recommend that at
each colloquium an outstanding academic should be invited to sketch ‘in the
state of the art and of theoretical thinking’ on the general topic at stake (as
Jacques Sijben did in Wiesbaden and later in 1994 in Dublin).
3.3. Period III
Two events in 1979 paved the way for our Period III, which we simply called
The Eighties: the reversal of US monetary policy towards a disinflationary
18 Surveying the Survey per Period
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Volcker and, in Europe, the launching of the European Monetary System
Usually the dividing line in the decade of the Eighties is drawn at the Plaza
Meeting of September 1985, when the Ministers of Finance, confirming an
already initiated market reversal of the dollar rate, stopped the unilateral
implementation of the US monetary policy and tended towards multilateral
policy cooperation.
I myself prefer the wording of our colleague in the Council Management,
Michael Artis, who, in a remarkable contribution to the 1986 SUERF
Colloquium in Luxemburg distinguished the post 1979 episode of (I quote)
‘putting one’s house in order’ and the ‘issue of the day’ afterwards, which he
called ‘unemployment’ and which I want to transform into ‘market-led
growth’. Anyway, the dividing line lies somewhere at the middle of the
decade, at the time when SUERF held a Colloquium in Cambridge, UK,
under the ominous title of ‘Shifting Frontiers.’
Eventually, our organisation held seven colloquia in that decade:
October 1980 Helsingør: Bank Management in a Changing Domestic and
International Environment
April 1982 Vienna: International Lending in a Fragile World Economy
October 1983 Madrid: Government Policies and the Working of Financial
Systems in Industrialized Countries
March 1985 Cambridge: Shifting Frontiers in Financial Markets
October 1986 Luxembourg: International Monetary and Financial
Integration – The European Dimension
May 1988 Helsinki: The International Adjustment Process – New
Perspectives, Recent Experience and Future Challenges for
the Financial System
October 1989 Nice: Financial Institutions in Europe Under New
Competitive Conditions
3.3.1.
In the first half of the decade the mood at the conferences was rather gloomy
in the wake of the second oil shock, the US-led disinflation drive and the huge
government deficits at that time. Two main themes emerged:
– international financial crisis?
– crowding out?
Surveying the Survey per Period 19
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concern that the post 1997 episode would end in an international financial
crisis. In the words of Alexander Swoboda that concern went, (I quote):
‘beyond the usual gloom associated with every recessionary or stabilization
phase’. Luigi Spaventa chose as the title of his contribution: ‘Gloom without
drama.’ This concern was justified: in the latter part of the same year, the
Mexican crisis broke out, it was a drama, but finally it did not result in
a generalised international financial crisis.
At every difficult moment there is a search and even a hunt for ‘villains’, for
those held responsible for the difficulties and tensions. In Vienna the three
main ones were:
– The international bankers, who were accused of reckless profiteering from
the recycling of the oil surpluses,
– The Eurocurrency markets, whose seemingly mysterious mechanisms
were suspected of hampering the conduct of monetary policy,
– The supervisors, whose restraining interventions against imprudent banks
might precipitate the very crisis, which the prudential regime is designed
to avoid.
One of the top villains, Rainer Gut, Chairman of Credit Suisse, had a sharp
reaction on the first issue. Some ‘excerpts’from his paper: “The oil price hike
created international payments and financing problems on an unprecedented
scale. At the time, the banks seriously doubted their capacity to cope with this
huge task. However, the governments which were called upon to support not
only hesitated, but, moreover, were forced by domestic restraints to cut
development aid precisely at a time when it was needed more than ever...The
international banking system had therefore to fill the gap, almost against its
will’ (sic)...The fear of the consequences of their own courage (sic)  is
understandable and has found expression in a banking climate which may be
described as cheerful pessimism.”
On the second issue, David Llewellyn demystified the Eurocurrencies
markets and concluded that these markets constituted no threat to the conduct
of monetary policy if this policy was what the Germans call: marktkonform.
In other words, market imperfections and impediments are the true villains.
As to the third issue, Peter Cooke, who later became famous for his capital
adequacy ‘Cooke coefficients’, recognised the supervisors’ dilemma but
stated, (I quote): “In playing their part in coping with this dilemma, the
20 Surveying the Survey per Period
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a sound prudential framework for the international banking system”.
In Helsingør 1980 and Madrid 1983, crowding out of the private sector and
also of the normal corporate banking activity became a major theme. At the
former, Pierre Ledoux, at the time President of the French Bankers’
Association started his address in Shakespearian terms:
‘Nous sommes ici au pays de Hamlet et la question fondamentale du colloque
ne devrait-elle pas se formuler: Pourra-t-on continuer à être banquier dans
les années 1980 ?’ We still survive...
Three years later, crowding out became the star of the Madrid Colloquium, at
least in the sayings of the General Rapporteur, Christian Lutz. This meeting
focused on the explosion of budget deficits in a period of stagflation. Otto
Emminger, former President of the Bundesbank, proposed a law of
government retrenchment instead of the well-known (at least in Germany)
Wagner law of increasing government expenditures.
3.3.2.
In the second half of the decade, the mood became more cheerful and
forward-looking, also at the SUERF Colloquia. In Nice 1989 Joël Métais,
Paris-Dauphine, even developed a theory of ‘la banque à géométrie variable’.
I singled out three dominant themes:
– Exchange stabilisation efforts inside and outside the EMS,
– Shifting frontiers from a government-led to a market-led system of
markets and institutions,
– Acceleration of the deregulation and liberalisation drive at the end of the
decade.
At the 1986 Luxembourg Colloquium Jean-Jacques Rey, together with Jan
Michielsen, reported on the first successes of the EMS. These mainly
concerned the stabilisation of exchange rates within the system: the so-called
intra-EMS rates.
European exchange rate stabilisation together with the positive outcome of
international counterinflation, opened new prospects for a tripolar policy
Surveying the Survey per Period 21
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adjustment process leading to a new equilibrium in international monetary
relations. This was the time of the 1987 Louvre Accord on international
exchange rate stabilisation and, in the literature, of the proposals about
various kinds of target zones for the key exchange rates.
At Luxembourg, Christian de Boissieu seemed seduced by the idea of a system
of three interdependent monetary blocks, but was sceptical about the robustness
of such a system. I quote: ‘le scénario de trios blocs monétaires est séduisant
parce qu’il rétablit de la symétrie dans des systèmes fondamentalement
asymétriques. Cependant, il a toutes chances d’être transitoire’.
Retrospectively, this statement proved to be prophetical, as far as the outcome
is concerned: a short time afterwards, the Louvre Accord proved not to be
able to resist market pressures. The optimism for global adjustment, which
was also to involve tackling the US payments imbalances and financing
developing countries, was still apparent at the Helsinki Colloquium 1988. It
disappeared afterwards, rendering obsolete a significant part of the literature
on policy cooperation that had been developed at that time.
What finally seems to have been the most important and the most enduring
development in the Eighties from the point of view of economic thinking, is
implied in the title of the 1985 Cambridge Colloquium: Shifting Frontiers in
Financial Markets. It resulted in a greater reliance on market forces as
a consequence of deregulation.
In Cambridge, the transition from a government-led towards a market-led
financial system was coined ‘the marketisation of banking and finance’ by
Jan Koning, of the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics. It did not take place at
once and at the same pace everywhere. In the mid-Eighties it still
differentiated the US and the UK from most countries of Continental Europe.
But at the end of the decade the process accelerated and generalised as
exemplified by the last colloquium of the decade: the 1989 Nice meeting.
There Alfred Steinherr, of the European Investment Bank expressed
a common feeling when introducing his presentation by the question:
“Why does it all happen now? ...What happens now is both a quantitative and
a qualitative jump with deregulation proceeding in many countries at a sharp
accelerated pace, capital controls being reduced in many parts of the globe,
innovation becoming a driving force and finance rapidly internationalising.
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at a rapid pace, which is the new phenomenon.”
Assessing this decade of the Eighties, we may state that the SUERF Colloquia
correctly and timely analysed and discussed the danger of an international
crisis in the early Eighties. This makes the 1982 Colloquium a landmark in
the series of meetings.
The same positive assessment applies to the shift from government-led
towards market-led financial activity with its intensification at the end of the
decade. Here the landmark is rather the 1985 Cambridge meeting. The
market-led activity induced more attention to bank organisation and bank
management in the subsequent development of SUERF.
As a contrast, SUERF was, in my opinion, rather late in assessing the outcome
of the disinflation effort, of the ‘remise en ordre’in the first half of the decade.
It was only in 1988 in Helsinki that this effort was considered as a ‘good job of
crisis management’ by the authorities (Peter Oppenheimer). However,
nowhere Ihave found an in-depth analysis putting into the balance the ultimate
positive effort and the hardships that had to be endured in the process. At the
end of this third period, we may provisionally round up our survey by having
a brief look at the list of the fifteen SUERF Colloquia held since Tilburg 1969.
3.4. Periods IV and V
At this stage of my exposé, after three periods, many among you will think:
still two periods to go. Anyway, so did I, when preparing this presentation. It
will be a relief for all of us, ladies and gentlemen, when I merge the last two
periods in the series: The Nineties and the Millennium Turn from 2000 to
2003.There are good reasons for such a merger. The topics and main themes
of the two periods are linked with one another, partly as action and reaction,
partly as action and further action. Moreover, many among you have been
personally associated with the developments in those periods, as actors or at
least as well-informed observers. We all have had a shock at the Fall of the
Berlin Wall in November 1989 and at the agreement on the Maastricht Treaty
in December 1991. Afterwards, we all felt the uncertainties and the risks of
transition, in the East as well as in the West. Many among us shared the
exuberance of markets at the end of the Nineties, at the launching of the euro,
followed by the reversal of financial markets, from bull to bear from the
second quarter of 2000 on. We are all aware of the new prospects but also
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of 10 countries to the European Union in May 2004 .We all know that we live
in a globalised world, dominated by technological progress, where volatility,
risk and fragility have become keywords of the financial discourse.
Amidst these developments SUERF held nine colloquia, six in the Nineties,
three in the present decade, up to the Tallinn Colloquium last June.
May 1991 Lisbon: Fiscal Policy, Taxation and the Financial System in
an Increasingly Integrated Europe
October 1992 Berlin: The New Europe – Evolving Economic and
Financial Systems in East and West
May 1994 Dublin: The Competitiveness of Financial Institutions and
Centres in Europe
October 1995 Thun: Risk Management in Volatile Financial Markets
May 1997 Budapest: Corporate Governance, Financial Markets and
Global Convergence
October 1998 Frankfurt: The Euro – A Challenge and Opportunity for
Financial Markets
April 2000 Vienna: Adapting to Financial Globalisation
October 2001 Brussels: Technology and Finance Challenges for Financial
Markets, Business Strategies and Policy Makers
June 2003 Tallinn: Stability and Efficiency of Financial Markets in
Central and Eastern Europe
By the ‘force of events’, Europe got involved, nearly at the same time, in two
transitions, and the SUERF Colloquia in what we call Transition Economics.
However, the two transitions were quite different in objectives and phasing.
They are only expected to converge in the present decade.
As you all know, in the East, the transition was one towards aprivatised market
economy and a two-tier bank system, whereas in the West it was the road
towards full EMU and a single currency through a process in three stages.
I have assembled the main themes discussed in the Nineties under three
headlines:
–T ransition in the East, after the Fall of the Berlin Wall,
–T ransition in the West: the bumpy Road to EMU, successfully ending in
the launching of the euro,
– The Domination of Markets.
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At the beginning, the length of the transition from 1989 until the start of
‘self-sustained growth on market principles’ was evaluated in a too optimistic
way at the SUERF Colloquia, just as in many other organisations. At the May
1991 Lisbon meeting Conrad Reuss spoke of 6–7 years. However, at that same
meeting, which concentrated on the saving-investment relation, several
contributors expressed the concern that savings would be insufficient to cover
the investment and financing needs of the Nineties. Governor Mervyn King, at
that time Professor at the London School of Economics, pointed out that, in the
1980s the aggregate saving ratio had declined by roughly 6 points in all major
countries. From the German side, no doubt was left about the increased public
transfers and expenditure induced by German economic and monetary
unification.
Already at the next Colloquium, held in Berlin in October 1992 under the
well-chosen title of ‘The New Europe’, the approach was more
down-to-earth. Deputy Governor Tietmeyer stressed that there was no unique
blueprint or ‘royal road’to successful reform. IMF Associate Director Guitián
stated that one had almost to start from scratch. Participants discussed the
pros and cons of different systems of corporate ownership on the basis of
a paper by Colin Mayer, at that time Professor in the University of Warwick.
A series of experiments in various transition countries was mentioned and
discussed with many question marks and qualifications. In general, opinions
and statements stuck to ‘the middle of the road’, between what Roy C Smith
(New York University) and Ingo Walter (INSEAD) called the
Anglo-American model of going ‘cold turkey’ into a free market system and
a gradualism without time path or limit. Much emphasis was put on the
imperative of ‘institution building’ and ‘the infrastructure of laws and
institutions’, which should accompany stabilisation.
Four and a half years later, at the May 1997 Budapest Colloquium, where
Alexandre Lamfalussy gave the final lecture, the keyword became
convergence. Council Member Morten Balling spoke in his introductory
presentation of common principles of corporate governance. However, most
contributions dealt with corporate governance problems in the West, quoting
aspects that were not immediately applicable to the East, at least at that time.
Afterwards, the convergence issue gained momentum when a significant
number of countries of Central and Baltic Europe applied for entry into the
enlarged European Union.
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progress made in the six years after the Budapest event. In the book,
I characterised this meeting as ‘the event with the right topic, at the right time
and at the right place, in small but active Estonia. The title of the Colloquium
was already an indicator of the progress made since Budapest 1997: ‘Stability
and Efficiency of Financial Markets in Central and Eastern Europe. This
refers to issues which also dominate discussions in the West. Even more,
I noticed that a number of high quality papers did not, as in Budapest,
originate from the West or from international organisations, but from
researchers working in the accession countries themselves. Progress in
techniques and analysis was impressive and points to a large convergence in
economic and financial research between East and West.
A significant number of contributions dealt with aspects of the sequence:
from transition towards convergence, from convergence to accession, from
accession to full European Union membership, from EU membership to full
Economic and Monetary Union and the euro. Applied to the prospects for the
financial sector, the main findings were:
– Much has been done in the last ten years but even more has still to be done.
– The growth potential of the financial sector is high because this sector will
at the same time benefit of the general growth of the countries involved
and of a catch-up effect linked with the present state of underdevelopment
of the financial sector itself.
– For growth, efficiency is more important than size.
– The role and performance of foreign banks in accession countries has been
and is still very positive (this was a striking but not unanimous
assessment).
– Prevention of currency and banking crises is essential. Monetary policy
focusing on exchange rate targeting and even on currency boards seems to
be preferred.
– After accession, more time is needed for full EMU membership and euro.
This indicates that transition in the East will not come to an end at the moment
of accession. However, it will develop in a stronger institutional set-up. In this
respect, Luigi Passamonti (IMF) suggested that if the benefits of the Single
Financial Market can be unlocked (I quote): “it is quite possible that the new
member states may become the main beneficiaries of the European Union
Financial Sector Plan.”
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The road to full EMU along the three stages of the Maastricht Treaty was
bumpy, even very bumpy at the beginning, before reaching a successful end
with the launching of the euro on January 1, 1999. Robert Raymond struck
the right tune when concluding his Marjolin Lecture at the 1995 Thun
Colloquium: ‘If the target can easily be determined, difficulties are in the
transition...’
At the Lisbon Colloquium Giovanni Ravasio pointed to the basic difficulties
of each transition. I quote: ‘Il y a une asymétrie des coûts et avantages dans
le temps. La Communauté supporte aujourd’hui les coûts d’ajustement, ceux
liés à l’incertitude de change... A l’opposé, les avantages de l’UEM ne seront
recueillis, pour l’essentiel qu à la troisième étape avec la monnaie unique.’
He also hinted at the permanent tension between the logic of integration and
the fear of losing too much national sovereignty. Consequently, he
recommended a transition as brief as possible. At the same meeting,
Jean-Jacques Rey sketched the current situation in mountaineering terms:
(I quote) ‘In mountain climbing, it is well known that climbing starts only
when one has walked a long time already.’ Instead of diminishing, the
uncertainties just mentioned increased and led to the exchange crises of
1992–1993. Nevertheless, Hans Tietmeyer, then Deputy Governor of the
Bundesbank stated at the 1992 Colloquium in Berlin that “EMS is an
important stop-over and also a test on the road to EMU”.
The most decisive development and also the most interesting one from the
point of view of economic and monetary thinking was what Tommaso Padoa
Schioppa wrote in his 1994 book, ‘The Road to Monetary Union in Europe’,
and what Niels Thygesen recalled in his masterly survey of Twenty Five Years
of European Monetary Unification, presented at the 1998 Frankfurt
Colloquium:
(I quote)... ‘The utopian perspective of full currency was confirmed as
ar ealistic option by the 1992–1993 crises in the EMS. With the degree of
capital mobility achieved at the end of the 1980s, fixed but adjustable
exchange rates might have become impossible to maintain’.
As a consequence and despite the hesitations of some central bankers and the
staunch opposition of many academics, which was also felt at the SUERF
Colloquia, the Single Currency and the Single Monetary Policy became the
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Colloquium was held in Frankfurt about six months after the final decision to
introduce the single currency and less than three months before the effective
launching of the euro. This explains why most papers reflected some
exuberance on the prospective structural effects of the introduction of the euro
and of the single monetary policy.
At that moment Europe resisted the East Asian Crisis rather well, which
induced Governor Tietmeyer to say, in his opening address, that the euro had
passed its first acid test, since it proved that the markets had accepted the
transition to monetary union as ‘irreversible’ and regarded the euro as a safe
haven. Academics, bank economists and also distinguished financial
practitioners explored the prospects for markets and institutions of the
introduction of the euro.
However, the optimism was not unlimited. Michael Artis argued, on the basis
of a clustering exercise on 18 countries, that a single monetary policy could
probably not always fit all and that policies to substitute for the loss of
independent monetary policies in some countries should be considered.
The most impressive and most balanced contribution to the colloquium was
undoubtedly the already mentioned survey of twenty-five years of European
unification in the Marjolin Lecture by Niels Thygesen.
He analysed the current state of monetary union in the light of five evolving
ambitions, constituting a logical sequence. His assessment was that only the
first three, or rather two and a half, of these ambitions had been fulfilled at the
start of full EMU and the launching of the euro:
– reducing, then eliminating nominal exchange rate fluctuations,
– reducing, then eliminating inflation,
– developing rules for non-monetary policies.
The qualified exuberance noticed at the Frankfurt Colloquium should be
explained and assessed as the celebration of the successful end of a long and
difficult journey. However, it would significantly be weakened by the
subsequent reversal of markets at the Millennium Turn. In a significant move,
the attention at the 2000 Vienna and 2001 Brussels meetings went to more
autonomous developments in the financial sector, driven by globalisation and
technological progress. And at the 2003 Tallinn Colloquium monetary
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sequence starting from transition.
3.4.3. The Dominance of Markets
In this oral presentation the developments at the level of markets and
institutions in the Nineties and after the Millennium Turn were an acceleration
and intensification of the forces and trends which broke through in the Eighties,
rather than anew and profound break in the financial system. Financial activity
in Europe remained market-led more than government-led but within that
framework some shifts occurred and much volatility was noticed.
These shifts attracted the attention of SUERF, particularly but not exclusively
in the mid-Nineties, and again after the Millennium Turn. A short list of
keywords may suggest the main issues discussed at the Colloquia:
In the Nineties:
– The shift from traditional intermediation by banks towards finance
through capital markets, which also involved the intervention of non-bank
intermediaries, such as securities houses. At certain moments, it was felt
that banking might well exhibit the characteristics of a declining industry.
The reversal of markets after the Millennium serious undermined this
trend towards capital markets.
– Competitive Environment: A review at the 1994 Dublin Colloquium
pointed to varying national bank strategies but often analogous pressures
of competition for more efficiency, more profitability and a reduction of
risks through diversification in large commercial banks. Except for the last
point, this also applies to the cost-cutting and restructuring imperative
after the Millennium Turn.
– Risk, Risk Management and Financial Fragility.This topic attracted much
attention from practitioners, who presented their experience at the 1995
Thun Colloquium. Martin Hellwig (University of Bern) related risk to the
erosion of margins in traditional banking and to the reduced ability of
banks to rely on oligopoly rents to withstand shocks.
–V olatility, Bubbles, Crises. At Thun, Charles Goodhart relativised volatility
and worsening risk perception. Empirical work in several Colloquia, done
by Claudio Borio & Robert McAuley and Philip Davis suggested that recent
outbursts of crises were due to the own dynamics of the market(s) involved
more than to fundamental economic and financial factors
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– Globalisation with its impact on efficiency and consolidation at the
micro-and meso-level and on financial stability at the macro-level,
–T echnology, as a dominant driver in a ‘paradigm shift’, changing all
aspects of banking in a fundamental way.
As a round up I have tried to make a list of top contributors to the analysis of
financial thinking at the Colloquia in the last fifteen years (and only in that
respect): besides Robert Raymond and Alexandre Lamfalussy in their
Marjolin Lectures, Andrew Crockett, Charles Goodhart, David Llewellyn,
Niels Thygesen, Axel Weber, and the empirical researchers Claudio Borio (in
association with Robert McAuley) and Philip Davis.
May I mention, in a subjective mood my four personal favourites, adding
a short quotation after each name?
– Jacques Sijben for his paper on the credit view in monetary economics at
the 1994 Dublin Colloquium: ‘The recent research on the operation of
credit markets and the revitalization of credit in macroeconomics is based
on the new economics of asymmetric information and incomplete
markets... Based on the Stiglitz-Weiss’ analysis the rise of bad loans in the
banking system and its attendant increase in outstanding debt of firms and
households, coinciding in time with a cyclical downturn, has increased
financial fragility...’
– Andrew Crockett, for his analysis of risk and financial instability at the
1995 Thun and at the 2000 Vienna Colloquium: ‘Just as policy makers
appeared to be emerging victorious from one exhausting battle, that
against inflation, another equally challenging front was opening up.
Financial globalisation has transformed geography, with significant
implications for the character of instability. Globalisation has heightened
the significance of “common factors’ in the genesis and unfolding of
financial distress.”‘
– David Llewellyn for his contributions on the New Economics of Banking
at the 1992 Berlin Colloquium and the 2001 Brussels Colloquia: “...If
economies of scale relate predominantly to bank processes rather than
institutions, and external contracts can be managed efficiently, the
existence of economies of scale does not mean that only large banks can
be competitive and survive. What in practice is likely to emerge is
a spectrum of different types of bank.”
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volatility and risk at the 1995 Thun Colloquium and about financial
regulation at the 2001 Brussels Colloquium: “Volatility is not secularly
increasing; the recent globalisation is not only desirable, but takes us back
towards the condition that had already been obtained at the start of this
century... ...It would not surprise me if, by the year 2010, we looked back
at the decades of the 1980s and 1990s as being one of general stability and
relatively little structural change... Many of the problems and
disturbances that we face today are neither new, nor by the most objective
standard particularly virulent...”
Taking an overall view of the Nineties and the first years after the Millennium
Turn and assessing these two periods lumped together, we are overwhelmed
by the frequency, the diversity and the intensity of events and changes: at the
international level, increasing globalisation; in Europe, single currency and
single monetary policy in the West; in the East, starting from scratch, a totally
new institutional financial framework; at the level of markets, technological
progress, competition and ebullience, followed by sharp reversals, banking as
a risky business. Sure, some of these developments will lose significance in
future assessments but much will prove irreversible.
Through its colloquia and its other activities and publications SUERF
followed and analysed these developments. Its membership and its audience
enlarged: more financial practitioners next to academics and bank
economists, more researchers and practitioners from the East. To capture the
developments into publications, the Colloquia Books no longer sufficed, they
have been supplemented by a new series of SUERF Studies, to which my
Survey and Anthology belong. However, I am convinced that the Colloquia
books, with their selection of the best papers of each Colloquium will remain
a reference and an anchor of overall SUERF activity. This brings me to my
final remarks. As I do not forget Nottingham, I will phrase them in French.
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Récapitulons donc et concluons. Je vous soumets trois points.
I. De la force des évènements à la force des idées.
Notre démarche aété de partir du thème général de chaque colloque, thème dicté
généralement par la force d’évènements récents, pour analyser les réactions et
réflexions et tenter d’en dégager le développement des idées en matière
monétaire et financière. La question se pose alors: Que valent ces idées, ne sont-
elles pas purement circonstancielles, ont-elles une valeur qui dépasse le moment
et le lieu de chaque colloque? En répondant, je tenterai d’être nuancé. Dans
beaucoup de cas, les idées exprimées ne sont pas des idées nouvelles. Elles
circulent déjà dans d’autres enceintes que SUERF. Mais aux colloques elles sont
analysées et testées par trois groupes à formation et orientation professionnelle
différentes: des banquiers centraux et leurs économistes, des praticiens bancaires
et leur service d’études (lorsqu’il existe encore), et des académiques. Elles aident
ceux-ci à former, confirmer ou corriger leurs propres opinions et travaux,
à disséminer les conclusions dans leur propre organisation et éventuellement
dans un public plus large et dans les médias. C’est cela leur valeur ajoutée.
Question complémentaire: ces idées, ont-elles à leur tour un impact sur les
événements? Directement: sûrement non. La SUERF est un forum et non un
lobby ou une école de cadres. De façon indirecte? Oui, je l’espère, selon la
voie mystérieuse que suggère une phrase empruntée à un ouvrage récent du
journaliste italien bien connu et fortement respecté Enzo Biagi: Non è vero
che le idee sono sempre innocenti...
II. La diversité des problèmes et la succession souvent rapide des idées au
cours des quatre décennies étudiées.
Peut-on y déceler une certaine cohérence, des fils directeurs? J’ai tenté de le
faire mais c’est à vous de juger. En tout cas, je vous recommande, lorsque
vous lirez le Survey dans le livre, de distinguer, mieux que ce que je ne l’ai
fait, les aspects suivants:
– les constantes dans l’évolution,
– les mutations de types différents, parmi lesquels – les mutations de
‘rupture’: comme après l’effondrement du système de Bretton Woods et le
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généralement suivies d’une période de tûtonnement et d’expérimentation,
ce qui donne aussi l’occasion à des théories nouvelles de pénétrer dans la
pratique et la politique monétaire et financière.
– les mutations ‘dialectiques’, avec thèse et antithèse, action et réaction.
Exemples: le passage de l’approche keynésienne au monétarisme, de
l’activité financière dominée par les autorités à celle dominée par les
marchés. Les théories sapent les systèmes existants mais les mutations se
produisent graduellement et souvent à un rythme différent de pays à pays.
– les mutations ‘rectilignes: les accidents de parcours mis à part, ces
mutations ne sont pas des renversements mais des mouvements dans la
même direction, fondés sur la même approche théorique mais se réalisant
à des rythmes et des modalités différents selon les circonstances.
Exemples: au niveau mondial, le mouvement de globalisation, au niveau
européen: l’intégration monétaire.
– Enfin, les problèmes non évoqués ou non résolus, qui, à la SUERF,
peuvent devenir sujets de nouveaux colloques et de nouvelles
publications. C’est ce qu’évoquait Peter Oppenheimer à la fin de son
rapport au Colloque d’Helsinki en 1988: “The solutions of one
quinquennium or one decade or one generation turn into the problems of
the next. Happily so, in order that the world’s economists and bankers may
go on conferring...”
III. Les Colloques SUERF comme reflet et caisse de résonance des mutations.
Par leur régularité, leur préparation soignée et leurs efforts de publication, les
Colloques SUERF sont un lieu et un instrument privilégié pour suivre,
analyser et discuter les mutations. L’invitation publique à soumettre des
contributions (le ‘call for papers’) a élargi à la fois l’éventail des sujets traités
et des auteurs. Des jeunes académiques mais aussi des jeunes praticiens
bancaires répondent à l’appel. Le grand nombre de propositions reçues
à l’occasion des derniers colloques sont à la fois signe de succès et source de
préoccupation. Comment, même après une sélection sévère, garantir, outre la
faisabilité physique, la cohérence interne du programme, concilier les
préoccupations de prudence, de vigilance et de stabilité des responsables, des
policymakers, et la passion des jeunes pour les techniques et les initiatives de
marché? Il ne m’appartient heureusement plus de relever ce défi. Je souhaite
bonne chance au Président et à ses collègues au Conseil et au Secrétariat.
J’incite vous tous, Mesdames, Messieurs, à participer aux Colloques des
quarante prochaines années, en reprenant à mon compte la tentative de
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à la fin de son rapport au Colloque de Dublin en 1994:
“...Competition for Markets and Turf
In finance can get pretty rough
But to see a real fight
Where everyone’s right
Attend a Colloquium of SUERF...”
Merci, thank you.
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discipline, which was enshrined in the Treaty and reinforced with the Stability
and Growth Pact (SGP). I would like, first, to revisit the theoretical and policy
justifications of this relationship and then use them to refer to the current
debate on the SGP.
The initial justifications for connecting monetary union with fiscal discipline
were of four types. The first is the most official and cited one. Using a recent
wording of the ECB
2, “in monetary unions sovereign issuers receive stronger
incentives to engage in debt financing because the impact of higher liabilities
in the form of higher real rates is not entirely borne by those authorities which
embark on fiscal expansion, but more widely shared by all their fellow
participants in monetary union”. Let me label this first justification
free-riding. A non-cooperative game can lead to a deficit of the whole
monetary union larger than the optimal level that would be chosen through
cooperation. To deal with this incentive problem disciplining rules can be
agreed upon such as the Maastricht 3% limit and the SGP.
The second justification is moral hazard. The disappearance of national
currencies introduces a default risk for all sovereign issues of the monetary
union. As the default of a country has substantial spill-over effects, the
incentive of each national government to discipline its budget is weakened by
the belief that other governments of the union and/or the common central
bank have good reasons to bail-out a defaulting country. This justification of
stability-pact-type constraints is difficult to confess with sincerity for the
authorities, as it presupposes a lack of credibility of the no-bailout clause of
Art 103 of the Treaty, an imperfect trust in the robustness of central bank
independence as well as in the efficiency of market discipline that should
discourage excessive borrowing by adding an appropriate default risk
premium to the interest rate.
Athird justification, that I will label room for stabilisation, refers specifically
to the SGP. The Pact imposes convergence toward structurally balanced
budgets in order to make room for fiscal stabilisation without breaking the 3%
Maastricht limit. This room is available for the working of automatic
stabilizers but it also allows some discretionary measures. It is indispensable
to counter asymmetric negative demand shocks in the euro area, where no
autonomy is left for national monetary policies.
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limits and the SGP. Fiscal rules have been adopted to render more
homogeneous and sustainable the weights of the public sectors in the
economies of the euro area. With tax competition, limiting deficits indirectly
lowers public expenditures. The weights of the public sectors are crucial
structural parameters of our economies and influence in several manners the
way they work. Converging public sector weights are thus part of the
minimum structural harmonisation which is desirable to maximize the
benefits of a single currency. From this point of view EU fiscal rules are in
place not only to avoid, in a negative sense, fiscal indiscipline, but also to
generate a certain amount of positive coordination. This positive aim is most
evident in the SGP’s prescription of well documented yearly Stability
Programmes, including the qualitative description of planned fiscal measures,
as well as in the connections between these programmes and the “Broad
Economic Guidelines” on the basis of which the Ecofin coordinates economic
policies according to Art 99 of the Treaty.
Fiscal discipline can obviously be an end in itself. But it has a very near
relationship with the functioning of the monetary union, which is brought into
relief by the four justifications listed above. Therefore ECB’s comments and
critiques on fiscal policies cannot be considered undue and arbitrary inroads
on governmental responsibilities, even though another, parallel European
independent agency, with the objective of coordinating and enforcing the
common fiscal policy guidelines
3, would constitute a more diligent
interlocutor of ECB’s fiscal monitoring than the governments themselves.
The above listed justifications of fiscal discipline in the EMU make also clear
that the word “growth” in the SGP neither is an occasional presence nor acts
as a pleasing counterpoise to the sad flavour of the word “stability”. The point
is that monetary and financial stability is a necessary condition for sound and
sustainable growth.
To  what extent are these justifications still valid today? Five years of
experience with the euro do not disprove the hypothesis of “free-riding”.
Placing euro-denominated government securities has been easy even for
highly indebted member countries. As far as “moral hazard” is concerned the
euro area still includes some countries where public debt is very high and
where partial forms of default
4 are not unimaginable in case, for instance, of
38 Fiscal Discipline in a Monetary Union: Issues for the Euro Area
3 More on this agency below and in footnotes 20–21.
4 Like interferences with the complete freedom of the market for government securities
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this potential risk is very small. This fact could signal the credibility of the
SGP as a long-term disciplining mechanism. But it could also mean that
markets expect bailouts of defaulting countries or that market pricing is
inefficient and the premium is inadequate
5. The importance of the moral
hazard argument for fiscal discipline is difficult to test.
To assess the validity of the “room for stabilization” argument several issues
are of relevance. First: which is the main cause of the fact that, in the recent
world-wide macroeconomic situation, the SGP seemed to leave insufficient
room for stabilization? Is it the special mixture of quality and intensity of the
unexpected global crisis that started in the last part of 2001
6? Or is it the
insufficient quality and quantity of the fiscal adjustments that were carried out
by several European countries in the three preceding years? In my opinion the
latter cause is more important and the European Council has been too weak
and forbearing in judging and managing the Stability Programmes.
Second: is the SGP, in its present version, sufficiently flexible to allow
compatibility between short-run stabilization in difficult times and
medium-term convergence to structurally balanced budgets? Ithink the answer
is a qualified yes. There is flexibility
7, but to make good use of it a better set of
incentives is needed. The SGP procedure depends too much on the
time-inconsistent behaviour of intergovernmental cooperation. The Council’s
co-ordination can be counterproductive as countries use the flexibility to
pardon each-others’ deviations from agreed fiscal consolidation paths. More
importantly, the quality of the deviations is not taken as a serious issue.
Deviations end up reflecting mainly domestic pressures of special interests.
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5 Perhaps also as a consequence of the high degree of substitutability given to the different
countries’ government securities by the current refinancing procedures of the ESCB
6As M. Buti, D. Franco and H. Ongena argued in their 1998 paper, a potential conflict between
discipline and flexibility was foreseeable, when the Pact was signed, precisely in the event of
a recession during the early years of EMU “when budget balances are still relatively close to the
3% threshold. Pro-cyclical fiscal policies would have to be implemented ... However the costs of
such a one-time action during the transition period ... would have to be weighted against those
arising from the loss of credibility due to a loose implementation of the pact. Given their systemic
nature, it can be argued that the latter outweigh the former”, Fiscal Discipline and Flexibility in
EMU: The Implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact, “Oxford Review of Economic
Policy”, vol. 14, No. 3, p. 94.
7An increase in flexibility could also result from the proposals to improve the implementation
of the SGPpresented by the European Commission in Strengthening the coordination of budgetary
policies, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament,
Brussels, 21.11.2002. See also the careful analysis of the evolving budgetary surveillance and of
the implementation of the SGP contained in European Commission, Public Finances in EMU
2003, Brussels, 21.05.2003, Part II, p. 39–72.
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asymmetric shocks and useless to enact euro-wide strategies of fiscal
stabilization against symmetric shocks.
A third issue is relevant to the discussion of the “room for stabilization”
argument: is fiscal stabilisation, generally speaking, an effective policy tool?
8
A scientifically adequate answer to this question would require a long
discussion of a highly controversial topic of modern macroeconomics. Suffice
here to say two things. To the extent that macroeconomic problems are caused
also by an unsatisfactory behaviour of aggregate supply, fiscal policies can
help only if they change the quality of public expenditures and receipts. From
this point of view, fiscal discipline in Europe is insufficiently
quality-oriented
9. As to the general theory of short-run fiscal stabilisation of
aggregate demand shocks, let me limit myself to saying that the probability of
perverse non-Keynesian effects as well as of dangerous impacts on long term
interest rates is smaller when short-run measures are part of a credible
long-term fiscal scenario. This is the reason why there is no trade-off between
fiscal stabilisation and fiscal consolidation and why a loss of credibility of the
SGP would hurt, and not help, fiscal stabilisation. The Pact should be
reformed, if this is needed to enhance its credibility which is currently, I think,
in serious danger
10.
In my opinion the rules and the institutional arrangements of fiscal discipline
in the euro area should be gradually changed in order to improve its
functioning and, in particular, in order to better reflect the fourth justification
of the discipline listed above, “positive coordination”. There have been many
proposals of reform of the SGP, to make it more flexible, more focussed on
debt sustainability, on the amount of public expenditure and on the “quality”
40 Fiscal Discipline in a Monetary Union: Issues for the Euro Area
8 Is it sufficiently important to justify a special and complex implementation of fiscal
consolidation and fiscal discipline in the euro area?
9Arecent ECB study looks at the different inputs and outputs of the public administration and
shows that the efficiency and the productivity of the public sector is low in the EU. “EU 15
countries are using 27% more public spending than the most efficient OECD countries”:
A. Alfonso, L. Schuknecht and V. Tanzi, Public Sector Efficiency: an International Comparison,
ECB Working Paper No. 242, July 2003, p. 24.
10 “Even the pact’s erstwhile supporters no longer rally to the defence of its economic
rational”: W. Munchau, Why the EU must reform its stability agreement, “Financial Times”,
October 6, 2003, p. 15. “The recent episodes involving France and Germany clearly indicate that
they will not ... continue to tolerate such a scenario, which is perceived as keeping them from
adopting better economic policies ... But if the outcome were that these countries simply begin to
ignore the goals of the ... SGP, other states would follow and the fiscal framework of EMU would
fall apart”: J. von Hagen, Fiscal Discipline and Growth in Euroland: Experiences with the
Stability and Growth Pact, Zei w.p. B 06 2003, section 4.
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its enforceability, to obtain a more efficient sharing of a euro-wide budgetary
target between member countries
11. My time is insufficient even to list them
here
12 and I will only mention two types of reform because they can help to
illustrate the case for “positive coordination”
13.
One is the “golden rule” idea of disciplining only the current deficit of the
public sector, while public investment, net of amortization, should be left out
of European fiscal rules
14. The theoretical merits of this proposal are known
15,
including its implication that the steady state public debt equals the stock of
public capital while the current SGP’s prescription of structurally balanced
budgets means that public debt eventually goes to zero. But we are also
conscious of the difficulties of agreeing on a suitable definition of public
investment and of checking its rigorous application. Moreover, one may have
doubts whether or not building useless bridges should be made easier than
building human capital or frontier scientific know-how. In more general terms
the “golden rule” can be criticized on the grounds that it uses a technicality,
a mechanical accounting principle, to help solving an undisclosed, deeply
political “positive coordination” problem. Individual governments have
inadequate incentives to assign the right priorities to the various kinds of
public projects, thus maximizing the collective interest of current and future
generations of European citizens. Insufficient public investment is only one
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11 To allow a market determined distribution of the euro-wide target, for instance, tradable
deficits permits have been proposed by A. Casella, Tradable deficit permits, in Brunila, Buti and
Franco (eds.), The Stability and Growth Pact: The Architecture of Fiscal Policy in EMU, Palgrave,
2001, 394-413.
12 A well organized survey of the main proposals can be found in: M. Buti, S. Eijffinger and
D. Franco, Revisiting the Stability and Growth Pact: grand design or internal adjustment?,
European Commission, Economic Papers n. 180, January 2003. A more recent paper is, for
instance, V. A. Muscatelli, P. Natale, P. Tirelli, A simple and Flexible Alternative to the Stability
and Growth Pact Deficit Ceilings. Is it at Hand?, CESifo Working Paper No. 1006, August 2003.
13Changing the Pact when the 3 largest countries of the euro area have difficulties to comply with
it could perversely worsen its credibility (see also the quotation in footnote 6 from M.Buti, D.Franco,
H. Ongena, 1988) and send a bad signal to smaller and accession countries. The reform should
therefore appear very different from an opportunistic slackening of the rules, it should look at the
steady state functioning of the Pact and show new ambitions, also from a political point of view.
14 In a weak form this proposal applies only to the SGP, i.e. to the formulation and monitoring
of member countries’Stability Programmes, with the 3% Maastricht limit still expressed in terms
of total gross public deficit. Maastricht picked the figure of 3% also because it was a reasonable
estimate of the upper limit of the long-run ratio between public investment and GDP. The
Maastricht limit is therefore a flexible substitute for a zero current balance rule. In a stronger form
the “golden rule” reform requires a change of the Treaty.
15 See, for instance, EU Commission, Public Finances in EMU 2003, COM(2003) 283 final,
section 5.2, p 92-96, and O. Blanchard and F. Giavazzi, Improving the SGP through a Proper
Accounting of Public Investment, mimeo, 2003.
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a distorted set of incentives.
From this point of view, a much more radical reform of European fiscal rules
should target the quality of national budgets, thus decreasing the probability
of counter-productive cooperation
16. The Council’s Broad Economic
Guidelines should gradually become a set of binding rules to be followed by
governments in planning not only their deficits but also the absolute
quantities and the types of public expenditures and receipts
17. The subsidiarity
principle can be respected to the extent that the common rules only refer to
the general characteristics of a set of budgetary programs. But general should
not mean vague and unenforceable. An incentive mechanism could be
established to keep arm’s length between centrally chosen guidelines and
nationally decided budgets as well as to reinforce the link between controlling
the deficits and influencing the quality of the budgets. This mechanism could
include fixing a set of coefficients, smaller than one, with which the
expenditures corresponding to certain projects favoured by the European
guidelines could be weighted to calculate the total deficit relevant for the
Stability Programmes
18. While the political responsibility of the goals of this
quality-structural-reform-oriented fiscal discipline
19 should rest in
a co-decision by the Council and the Parliament, with the initiative and the
assistance of the Commission, the management and enforcement of this type
of fiscal discipline would benefit from the creation of an independent agency
for euro-wide fiscal policy
20, a sister institution for the ECB, that would
receive the general goals by the political level and would interact with
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16 C. Bastasin and F. Bruni: Patto di Stabilità: cambiarlo senza far male all’Europa, “La
Stampa”, August 14, 2002, p. 6; Una forza nuova per il Patto, “La Stampa”, September 25, 2002,
p. 1; Una riforma di poche ambizioni, “La Stampa”, Novembre 28, 2002, p. 1.
17 Qualitative fiscal discipline could aim at avoiding an excessive dimension of the public
sectors but also at preventing excessive tax competition and promoting the production of certain
types of public goods.
18 This mechanism would be a generalization of the golden rule which assigns a coefficient
equal to 1 to all current expenditures and equal to 0 to the whole amount of net public investment.
But the mechanism could be much more selective in favouring certain types of investments, as
well as certain current expenditures (and tax-cuts) like, for instance, those connected to education,
research, labour market and welfare reforms, and other projects that have short-term political and
economic costs but highly productive long-term results. Favoured expenditures should be defined
in general but rigorous terms and national governments invited to submit specific projects with
well specified characteristics. When these characteristics are judged compatible with central
guidelines, the corresponding coefficient is assigned to calculate the weighted public deficit
entering the accounts of the SGP.
19 The favoured expenditures system could allow governments to increase, within certain
limits, short-run deficits to implement reforms that will surely improve the debt/GDP ratio in the
longer run; see, for instance, A. Razin and E. Sadka, The Stability and Growth Pact as an
Impediment to Privatizing Social Security, CEPR Discussion Paper n. 3621, 2002.
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and in the best possible way
21.
Let me conclude by saying that anew emphasis on the qualitative aspects of fiscal
discipline would not weaken its relationship with the single monetary policy, for
many reasons, including the fact that it would render easier, better understood
and more acceptable, the quantitative discipline of public deficits. Moreover,
a centralized agency for fiscal policy could have a useful dialogue with the
ESCB
22 which would cease to appear as the sole macroeconomic policy agency
of the Union bearing all the criticisms, also outside its specific responsibility for
price stability. It is unfortunate that neither the proposal of upgrading the
coordination of fiscal policies nor the idea of an independent budgetary agency
would find any relevant support in the present European political climate
23.
I thank you very much for your kind attention.
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20 An independent fiscal stability council has already been proposed, among others, by J. von
Hagen and I. Harden, National Budget Processes and Fiscal Performance, “European Economy –
Reports and Studies”, 3, 1994, 311–418. According to von Hagen, Fiscal Discipline and Growth
in Euroland, op. cit., “an obvious alternative candidate [as an independent euro-wide institution
for fiscal surveillance] would be the European Central Bank”: in my opinion this is far from
obvious and could deeply complicate the life of the ECB! The creation of Fiscal Policy
Committees at the national level has been suggested by C. Wyplosz, Fiscal Policy: Rules or
Institutions?, Group of Economic Analysis of the European Commission, mimeo, April 2002.
Asystem of national agencies would be compatible with a central EU agency and analogous to the
ESCB. National public investment agencies are also proposed by Blanchard and Giavazzi, op.cit.,
to micromanage in a transparent way a system where public investment net of amortization is
excluded from SGP’s deficit accounting.
21 This agency would have disciplinary powers as it would decide whether or not a certain
project has the characteristics required to be assigned a special coefficient. It should also be
suitably involved in the excessive deficit procedure and in the connected fining decisions.
A complete enactment of such a reform of European fiscal discipline would require a change of
the Treaty. But it is possible to move in the direction of qualitative fiscal discipline in a gradual
way, starting with some modifications to the SGP and strengthening the relevance of the Broad
Economic Guidelines, without changing the Treaty.
22 To carry on a dialogue does not mean to try the ex ante coordination of monetary and fiscal
policies which “gives rise to the risk of confusing the specific roles, mandates and responsibilities”
of the two policies (O. Issing, How to achieve a durable macroeconomic policy mix favourable to
growth and employment?, Conference on “Growth and Employment in Europe”, European
Commission, May 2000). Ad hoc coordination of macro-policies looks particularly inefficient if
one takes into account the imperfection of the authorities’ information on the functioning and on
the status of the macro-economy: “ Since it is difficult to identify correctly the nature of shocks
and agree on their propagation over time and possible spillovers of joint policy actions, as well as
to reach a common understanding of the ‘true’model of the economy, the pursuit of active policy
co-ordination can often be counter productive”: ECB, Monthly Bulletin, February 2003, p.43.
23 “The current preferences for political integration imply that fiscal policy stay decentralised
and coordination continues to be mainly of the negative type, reflecting an enduring mistrust
among euro area members. Obviously, if the single currency increases the taste for political
integration towards a fully-fledged federal structure, a different and more efficient public finance
system could be devised”: M. Buti, S. Eijffinger and D. Franco, 2003, op. cit., p ii.
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The presentation was in three parts.
The first part describes the broad environment in which financial markets
operate today both worldwide and in Europe. Several elements enabled the
impact of the 1999 crisis: to be minimised. First, banks’ equity endowment
was significant; second, risk transfers were efficient and third, both the
Fed’s and the ECB’s reactions were adapted to the situation. As for today, the
situation is far from being plain. In particular, questions arise about the
treatment of derivatives. Moreover, one can wonder what will be the likely
costs of the cuts in US interest rates.
Akey issue is whether financial globalisation is leading to a more, rather than
a less, crisis-prone financial system? There are several pros and cons in this
debate, and the overall conclusion is that the jury will remain out on this
question for some time to come. The point is that in the present environment
if a crisis were to erupt in one part of the world it could spread more swiftly
to the rest of the world, and could take on more globally damaging
proportions than hitherto. To prevent this happening, or to fight an emerging
systemic crisis, well organised cooperation needs to be reached among the
key monetary authorities of the world. We have, then, to consider the fact that
Europe has embarked on a process of financial integration, which is already
well advanced in some areas (such as the inter-bank market or the government
debt market) but much less in others (such as cross-border bank mergers).
There is no doubt that the process will continue and possibly even accelerate.
This implies that a local crisis could easily have Europe-wide ramifications,
and would therefore have to be handled accordingly. And, since Europe is
a significant part of the financially globalised world, its authorities will have
to speak with one voice in any “global” policy co-ordination.
The second part of the presentation discusses, at the level of general
principles, the role of Central Banks in crisis management and crisis
prevention. As regards crisis handling, their role does not appear to be highly
controversial: they should provide liquidity to the system as a whole, and
should ensure the proper working of the payments system. They should not
be called upon to take on credit risks by lending to banks that are, or are about
to become, insolvent. “Bailing out”, which amounts to putting at risk
taxpayers’ money, should be a government responsibility. Central banks may
give a helping hand in organising rescue operations involving banks, but even
here they would be well advised to do this under government guidance.
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risks are clear, the behaviour to adopt as regards prevention is more blurred.
Since banks are the providers of liquidity to the rest of the financial system,
and are at the core of the payments system, the main task of crisis prevention
is to rein in the crisis-producing proclivities of banks and to ensure that they
possess crisis-resistance capabilities in case of “external” shocks. There is no
consensus on whether the prudential supervision of banks should be a central
banking responsibility or whether it should be handed over to a specific
organisation, more or less under government control. In this regard, we can
observe different approaches around the world. I do believe, however, that
even when a central bank is not entrusted with operational supervisory
responsibilities, it should be institutionally involved, in one way or another,
in banking supervision. There are two good reasons for this. No one has ever
been able to establish a crystal clear distinction between micro- and
macro-prudential responsibilities; equally, in practice it is well-nigh
impossible to define when crisis prevention stops and when crisis
management begins. The absolute minimum is to ensure a free flow of
information among all the participants responsible for maintaining financial
stability.
Third, I voice some – moderate – concerns about our current institutional
arrangements in Europe. These concerns derive from the observation of three
peculiarities of our arrangements. One is this fact that some of the members
of the ESCB have operational responsibilities for bank supervision, while
others have not. This does not help to define constructively the role to be
played by the ECB, to put it mildly. Homogeneity would not solve all the
problems, but it would help. Second, the UK is not part of the Eurosystem,
while London is Europe’s largest financial centre. Third, and perhaps most
important, neither ECOFIN nor the Eurogroup of finance ministers seem to
possess the institutional simplicity which would endow them with a capability
of acting, in the case of a crisis, with speed and clout. EMU stands for
Economic and Monetary Union; but while the “M” leg of EMU is well
organised and solidly established, the same does not apply to the “E” leg. This
asymmetry is unhelpful – but perhaps not more than that – when it comes to
designing the optimal macroeconomic policy mix for the euro area as
a whole. It could however lead to more serious problems in a situation of
systemic crisis when smooth and efficient cooperation between the ECB and
the finance ministries becomes an absolute requirement. And the success of
any such cooperation critically hinges on cooperation among governments.
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a– About the communication between finance ministers and central banks:
The presidency of the Council of European Union, which is only 6 months
long, seems too short to develop an efficient organisation of the
communication with monetary authorities.
b– About a unique economic decision centre at the European level
As has already been said, decisions have to be immediate. One necessary
condition for this is the non-multiplication of decision centres. Whereas there
is only one decision centre for monetary policy within the Eurosystem, this is
not the case as regards economic policy. The point is to define precisely who
is to take the decision and when, knowing that a communiqué is not enough
in a crisis context.
c– About the central bank responses to variations in asset prices
If asset prices were to be stabilised by central banks, serious moral hazards
could arise which could lead to hazardous and harmful behaviour. Actually,
asset prices cannot be handled in the same way as the inflation rate is. The
public mind might react badly to the intervention of the central banks in order
to stabilise asset prices. However, if monetary policy does not want to fight
bubbles, who is to do something against these?
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Europe matured over time. It took the duration of a generation to make it
acceptable. The single currency is today a reality, a structural feature of the
European Union, part of the “acquis communautaire”. This is the absolute
truth, even though afew of the 15 member countries continue to keep their own
currency. Joining the euro area or not is their problem, it is not a problem for
the euro. The euro has sufficient economic basis. Their absence is
disappointing only to the extent that it reflects a reluctance to foster European
integration.
The euro being our companion for the foreseeable future, the question posed
in 1998 was: what comes next? The answer was obvious to many: give the euro
an efficient domestic market. This could be seen as a mere completion of what
had just been done. It appeared also as afurther step in the construction of atrue
Union in Europe. Economists added the more sophisticated, but essential and
convincing argument that an integrated, in asense single, capital market would
be more efficient, i.e. more liquid and with lower transaction costs, than the
co-existence of national markets, thus allowing the optimal allocation of
capital.
From the start, the EMI-ECB organisation set up a quasi perfectly integrated
interbank market, the network of central banks providing for the transfer of
central bank money in real time all over the Union. However this did not
encompass retail payments, and the integration of the securities and derivatives
market proved to be much more difficult. In the latter case, political resistance
was a relatively minor factor, as transfers of sovereignty were less than in the
case of monetary unification. On the contrary, technical complexity, as well as
the vested interest of market participants who do not care too much about
a global regional project, were – and still are – genuine obstacles.
Indeed, progress is being made with the Action Plan of the Commission on
financial services and the reform of the decision-making process, following
the proposals of the Wise Men led by Alexandre Lamfalussy. However, there
is still a long road ahead. Let me make four comments on this issue. The first
one will consist in analysing more carefully what we are aiming at. The three
others will focus on three different parts of what should be done in my view:
legal issues, regulation and supervision, and finally the central securities
depository function.
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The objective is to create a single domestic capital market which would work
efficiently. What do we mean exactly?
It cannot be a market proper to the euro zone. It must cover the whole Union.
After all, London may be seen as one of the main financial centres of the euro
zone, as all financial entities located in the euro area, which matter on
markets, have an investment banking arm in London and do business in euro
there.
Neither is it a market specific to EU issuers as non-EU issuers are kindly
invited to come, whereas some EU companies prefer to issue abroad, at least
partially. Similarly, it is not a market proper to EU investors.
The purpose is, indeed, in an open world, to attract, maintain and develop the
business of financial services within the limits of the European Union. In
a sense, this is a pure business approach.
In theory, the conditions are clearly identified. In order to cut transaction
costs, we must establish a level playing field on which banks, brokers,
exchanges and clearing houses can compete in providing services. This
requires a single set of rules of the game and a borderless architecture of the
infrastructures necessary to transfer not only money, but also securities and
contracts. It would result in an increased liquidity of the financial market.
I now see this task as being more in the spirit of the Single Act than
a follow-up of monetary union.
Vis-à-vis non-residents, success would bring fees to the EU and create jobs,
as has already been the case in London in the past. At the same time, on the
rebound the euro would become more attractive. Such a market would be part
of the attractiveness of Europe and therefore would increase the use of its
dominant currency. All residents would benefit from a liquid and cheap
capital market, according to the reasoning we had in mind in 1998 and which
is still relevant.
It should not be a market restricted to the euro as such, i.e. to financial assets
and contracts denominated in euro. It should, indeed, be a market for all
54
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would certainly be happy to see the entire world preferring the euro to any
other currency (although it would probably create a monstrosity), but in the
absence of exchange control, the choice of the currency remains open.
As ecumenical as one might be, one cannot however ignore the existence of
a tight technical link between this project and the monetary status of the
European Union. I see it as follows: within the Union, deals on securities are
settled through accounts on the books of resident financial intermediaries
which, in turn, hold central bank money on their own account at the central
bank. Non-resident intermediaries, not holding directly central bank money,
may act through a European correspondent. There would therefore be no
difficulty in requesting a settlement in central bank money before any transfer
of securities at the level of the central depository agency, either national or
European. It is then enough to separate the central depository function, the
so-called notary function, where it is associated with commercial services,
and to build a bridge with the central bank (either the Eurosystem or the
central bank of a country with a derogation). This would be the basis for
a European system of delivery versus payment which would be simple, safe,
open to all users trading securities in euro or another EU currency. I will come
back to this in my fourth remark.
In a nutshell, we should have a business approach but, at the same time, take
advantage of the facilities provided by the well-established integrated
interbank market to better satisfy the needs of our European compatriots.
The Objective 55
Suerf 2_2004  4.7.2004  17:53  Stránka 552. A European Legal Framework
The diversity of legal frameworks within the European Union is the main
obstacle to a true integration of the financial market. This subject, however,
is not intensely dealt with. There could be several explanations. One is the
nationalistic reaction: our civil and commercial laws are an expression of
national culture. Another could be the fear that a comprehensive reform
would change many aspects of private life, many habits or traditions, and
would jeopardise vested interests, although it is to some extent possible to
adopt grandfathering clauses. Finally, the complexity of the whole thing is
clearly a disincentive.
As a result, the principles and the architecture of national law are seen as
being structural. Diversity among legal regimes is seen as unavoidable.
Efforts to harmonise the principles which are the basis of civil laws, company
laws, contracts, ownership, etc, are weak. Experts are not many to feel
committed. There are very few think tanks working on it.
Some hope might be given by the growing number of Directives adopted at
the European level which are converted into national written rules. However,
not only is this process slow, but it is also disappointing in two respects. First,
national law can complement Directives with additional provisions, the
Directive being in this case no more than a minimum constraint. Second,
provisions deriving from Directives are sometimes just exceptions to the
national regime. They apply to specific operations, without changing the
fundamental national law which applies in all other cases. A good example is
the Directive on collateral which applies to interbank operations and not to all
contracts. Indeed, we should go to the roots of legal provisions in domains
related to business.
An apparently good idea, which is now promoted, is to elaborate a sixteenth
legal regime, although if it remains optional there is a risk to increase and not
reduce complexity.
The last report of the Giovannini group has listed a number of legal issues
which require an urgent harmonisation, with a view to improve the
functioning of the capital market, such as:
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securities);
– what restrictions to the right of ownership can be opposed to third parties;
– date of change of ownership following a transaction (important for the
trading and delivery industries);
– company laws (important for issuers to act on a level playing field);
– bankruptcy laws (important for investors and the delivery industry).
I should add practical matters mentioned to me by lawyers. These matters
have to do with how to go to court, the degree of transparency of the files to
be provided to it, the time-length of the procedure.
The European Commission has recently acknowledged the need to harmonise
basic laws which matter in economic and financial areas, such the laws on
contracts. This may be promising.
To conclude in two words and be constructive, let me say that, although no
global solution is to be found tomorrow morning or the day after, we lack of
what the Werner report has been to monetary union. I therefore suggest that
the Heads decide to lock up a small number of prominent experts with a clear
mandate until they have drafted a document including concrete proposals on
how to move forward.
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The fears inspired by the consolidation of national regulatory and supervisory
authorities are exaggerated. Considering first the regulators, I do not deny the
value of the proposals made by the Wise Men under the chairmanship of the
wisest of them, Alexandre Lamfalussy. I see these proposals as a useful step,
which does not prevent to reach an upper level of integration. In the field of
securities transactions, nevertheless, it remains to be seen if the new
organisation will have given any impetus to the implementation of the Action
Plan on financial services. I also hope that controversial issues will not be
transferred to level 3, i.e. will just not be harmonised.
I personally would see great benefits to be gained from the creation of a new
European System made of national teams ensuring the interface with local
financial institutions, and a central body constantly comparing principles and
practices, reporting on differences and inconsistencies, making proposals. Of
course, I dream of the Secretariat, in this case, of CESR, becoming
a European Financial Institute. Better sooner than later.
Should there be three networks, for securities markets, banks and insurance
companies or only one? This question has been analysed in an Italian paper at
a recent SUERF seminar. Given the blurring of frontiers between the three
categories of activities, the intrusion of companies belonging to one sector
into another sector, directly or through subsidiaries, I would favour a single
organisation with specialised departments and an internal structure ensuring
close co-ordination.
Considering now supervision, and to save time, I would just add: follow the
same path.
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Cross-border transfers of securities should be done as if there were no borders
within the European Union. In particular, cross-border trades should not be
subject to extra-costs, as is the case today. We know that some extra-cost is
related to the legal heterogeneity of the EU market. This is why, in my second
comment, I recommended to work more intensely and concretely on these
matters. Besides this, part of the cost is due to the diversity and complexity of
the delivery arrangements. The delivery of securities involved in cross-border
trades is done through the central depository agency in charge of this type of
securities. So far, there is one in each country plus two taking care of
international issues: Euroclear based in Brussels and Clearstream in
Luxembourg. The two latter, contrary to national CSDs, have mixed this
activity with commercial services such as clearing and the financing of
negative cash balances. Although some progress is being made by adopting
common electronic standards in order to ensure some degree of
interoperability, there are still different information systems, diverse
conditions for giving access to the CSD, various ways of squaring cash
balances.
This is why it seems necessary to many issuers, investors and intermediaries
that a uniform architecture prevails across Europe. I fully agree that most
financial services should be left to market players competing together:
trading, clearing, financing, custody. On the contrary, the notary function
should be separated from the rest, located in a single system, which could be
decentralised or not, but would in any case provide equal access to all players.
With the co-operation of the central banks, it would be possible to link the
final delivery with a settlement in central bank money, as explained at the end
of my first remark. Resident intermediaries may borrow central bank money
on the interbank market or even directly from their central bank through
collateralised repos, as has been done in France, fir instance, for years.
Non-residents would have to use correspondent banking with resident
financial institutions, as is they do for all other categories of payment.
How could we get there? On the one hand, the linkage between the central
banks and the settlement in central bank money might be associated with the
reform of TARGET. On the other hand, can the establishment of a single CSD
be left to market forces?
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over six national CSDs. However, Euroclear is not the sole big player in this
field. There is the risk that it will take a long time before it covers all member
countries of the Union, if it ever happens. In addition, there is a need to obtain
that the CSD function is isolated within the two ICSDs. I therefore feel that
pressure should be put on these various institutions for them to move faster
and in the right direction. May I recall that the first gatherings of CSDs and
ICSDs were organised by the European Monetary Institute around 1997,
under the chairmanship of Mr Hartmann, a member of the Direktorium of the
Deutsche Bundesbank, at that time in charge of the Working Group on
Payment Systems. As a result of this initiative, these institutions have set up
their professional association (i.e. the European Central Securities
Depositories Association – ECSDA).
The architecture I have described has prevailed in the United States, where
the DTC is the sole central depository agency. There is the risk that, should
we miss the train, the biggest players in London, most of them being from an
American origin, could circumvent the difficulty by organising something
similar for their own needs. Unfortunately, this new product would not be
tailored for the size and shape of the European Union.
*
*        *
I realise that several remarks I made might be shocking for some bankers,
exchanges, custodians and lawyers specialised in the resolution of
international conflicts. Building up a single market implies more competition,
lower costs, less conflicts, no legal or fiscal arbitrage. It is in the general
interest.
The euro area, or even better the European Union, should from now on be
considered as the domestic market of the euro and more generally as a single
financial market. Cross-border activities should only mean exchanges with
other economic areas in the world.
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It is a great pleasure for me to speak at this anniversary seminar, not only
because of the topic you have chosen – European financial and monetary
integration – but also on account of your members. You are contributing to the
vitality of SUERF, which is unique in nature: a forum bringing together
“practitioner” economists and academics who share one of the most
stimulating areas of research: financial and monetary economics in Europe.
I would like to salute the vision of the founders of this association, and its
successive Chairmen, who have enabled SUERF, over the past forty years, to
elicit research, publications and seminars on essential areas prompted by
developments in the European integration process and the financial industry.
In 1997, I had the honour of speaking at the SUERF Lecture held at the
University of Copenhagen. I discussed prospects in the run-up to the euro,
several months before its introduction. Now that the euro is in circulation, you
are affording me the opportunity to further my thoughts. Today, I wish to
make a number of comments on the interactions between the degree of
optimality of a currency area, and the implementation of economic policies.
I will now discuss three ideas:
1) The correlation of business cycles between euro area countries reflects
both one of the conditions and a consequence of our currency
area’s “optimality”, which must be consistently ensured
2) In an evolving environment, fiscal policy must perfectly fulfil its
function in the event of asymmetric shocks;
3) Structural policies must promote the endogenous forces to strengthen
the euro area.
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CHARACTERISTICS OF THE “OPTIMALITY” OF OUR
CURRENCYAREA, BUT IT IS AN ACHIEVEMENT THAT
MUST BE MAINTAINED
Three essential foundations for characterising currency areas were
highlighted in studies by Mundell and MacKinnon in the early 1960s: the
integration of financial, product and services and labour markets.
The integration of the product market is currently the most apparent
foundation of the robustness of our monetary union. A high degree of trade
interdependence links euro area countries to each other. For example,
half of the external trade of France and Germany consists of intra-euro
area flows
24;a saweighted average for the euro area this proportion
stands at 50%
25.
Around two-thirds of the imports and exports of Central and Eastern
European countries (CEECs) are carried out with the euro area. Forty percent
of this is intra-industry trade, compared with 50% for intra-euro area
intra-industry trade. These data undeniably confirm the dynamic integration
process.
Trade interdependence in the euro area has developed between relatively
diversified economies, and in particular in the form of intra-sectoral trade.
Consequently, over the past forty years, a tendency towards the specialisation
of sites has emerged within each economy, leaving economies with a fairly
large degree of sectoral diversification.
We  do not have sufficient hindsight to determine the extent to which this
model of interdependence via intra-sectoral trade will continue to prevail, or
whether increased sectoral specialisation will develop. I tend to believe that
the second hypothesis is the most likely. This issue must be borne in mind in
all forward-looking studies on the conditions for enhancing the “optimality”
of the euro area, and I will come back to this point in my third series of
comments.
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24 2002 data for France: exports + imports as a % of GDP = 26.3%, of which extra-euro
area = 13.2%. Same year for Germany: 34% and 19.6% respectively. Figures from the two
previous years are of a similar order of magnitude.
25 Average over the period January 2002 – August 2003.
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are high for industry – over 0.8 for France and Germany for example – and
the correlation is “contemporaneous”. The European services cycle is
however less marked and more fragmented between countries. For Central
and Eastern European Countries, the coefficient is 0.45 on average for the
industrial output index, with a broad dispersion of individual situations.
However,  trade interdependence is not in itself sufficient to guard
a Monetary Union against the asymmetric shocks affecting the area’s different
economies. The correlation of cycles also closely depends on the degree of
convergence of economic structures and national economic policies.
This degree of convergence may be assessed to a certain extent by taking
into account rates of inflation. I wish to stress that euro area monetary policy
has a euro-area-wide price stability objective and does not act directly on
national inflation differentials. Yet, these inflation differentials may reflect, on
the one hand, the degree of homogeneity of economic structures and, on the
other, an ability to absorb asymmetric shocks within the area. They therefore
constitute a useful indicator. At present, the average annual standard deviation
of inflation (measured by the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices)
between euro area Member States is comparable to that prevailing between
the 14 main metropolitan statistical areas of the United States. This is
a remarkable result considering that monetary union came into force in 1913
26
in the United States. Admittedly, inflation differentials between euro area
countries are not negligible, but this is not specific to our currency area.
The homogeneity of the euro area also relies on the similarity of financial
structures between countries and the integration of financial markets
The relative homogeneity of financial structures – illustrated for example in
the “Report on financial structures” published by the European Central Bank
in 2002 – shows that the transmission channels of monetary policy are also
fairly comparable, with the interest rate channel playing the prominent role in
all countries and the bank credit channel a less predominant role 
27.
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26 Actually the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 sets the framework for a single monetary policy.
However the founding principle of a monetary union dates back to the Constitution that included
a clause forbidding States to coin money and emit Bills of Credit after 1787.
27 These were the findings of a series of studies coordinated by the Eurosystem Monetary
Transmission Network, and published in the ECB Working Paper Series No. 91–114.
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for completing the integration of infrastructures (trading platforms,
delivery-versus-payment systems, central securities depositories), and
procedures and standards have been gathering momentum. The “Lamfalussy
method”, in application as of 2001, has now been enhanced by the rapid
implementation of the European Commission’sFinancial Services Action Plan.
In addition to an already highly integrated money market, whose turnover and
homogeneity are comparable to those of the US market, – even though the
volumes traded within the individual segments are not entirely analogous on
these two major markets –, the rapid integration of markets will no doubt
foster increased depth and liquidity, which will naturally strengthen the euro
area’s capacity to absorb asymmetric shocks: these shocks can be spread over
a greater number of counterparties, with a much better exploitation of
arbitrage opportunities, in particular intertemporal trades.
HOWEVER, THE DEGREE OF LABOUR MARKET INTEGRATION IS LOW
AND LABOUR LAW IS A SOURCE OF RIGIDITYAND HETEROGENEITY
Measuring the integration of the labour market is not an easy task, given the
large number of variables to be taken into account. I will cite three
considerations:
– first, the dispersion of unemployment rates: different composite dispersion
indicators show that there is a higher degree of dispersion in the euro area
than in the United States, but the differential is not however very
significant
28. Furthermore, in the United States there is a complex and
dynamic economy and, at times, some states may be booming while others
are in the process of redevelopment, which temporarily generates
substantial unemployment differentials;
– second, differences in labour market structures. For example, according to
various estimates by the European Commission, the relative weight of
public sector employment is twice as great in some countries as in others:
for example, 14% in the Netherlands, 17% in Germany, and over 30% in
66 Optimal Currency Areas and Implementation of Economic Policies
28 Calculations for the 11 countries (excluding Luxembourg) in the euro area and the
52 American states, over the period January 1993-July 2003: average of the standard deviation to
average unemployment rate ratios: 0.18 in the United States and 0.20 in the euro area. Min-max
difference ratio: 0.4 in the United States, 0.6 in the euro area (and 0.52 excluding Ireland). Taking
different reference periods, the dispersion is sometimes lower in the euro area than in the United
States, in particular at the period-end. Among other conclusions, it can be deduced from these
results that geographical mobility is not yet so developed in the United States as to level out, in
the short term, unemployment rate differentials between regions.
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relative weight of the “informal sector” appears to vary between around
5% in countries where the informal sector is the least developed and 20%
in those where it is traditionally the most extensive
29;
– third, institutional obstacles. These include the highly incomplete mutual
recognition of diplomas and qualifications, differences between
unemployment insurance regimes, and the lack of transferability of rights
acquired in national health and pension systems.
– Moreover, the complexity of labour laws in many countries
30 suggests that
rapid progress in this area could only be achieved through strong political will.
It is this same political will that lent credibility, during the 1990s, to the
objective of European Monetary Union. Without doubt, as regards European
unification, major labour market reforms are still necessary, and an association
such as SUERF could contribute greatly to enhancing and disseminating the
economic arguments underlying the importance of this issue.
In sum, the euro area’s solidity stems from:
– an already highly integrated product and services market;
– integrating financial markets;
– relatively homogeneous structures – excluding labour markets;
– the combination of these three aspects, which are reflected in the
correlation of the business cycle.
The euro area is however still young and its capacity to absorb asymmetric
shocks has not yet been fully put to the test. Moreover, the euro area, just like
any other currency area, is a permanently evolving entity and vigilance is
required with regard to its position in terms of optimal currency area criteria.
This leads me to two other series of comments:
– In order to become resilient to such shocks the euro area must adhere to
the principles of sound fiscal management ensuring that national budgets
have enough flexibility to withstand asymmetric shocks;
– So as to preserve and enhance the optimality of the area regardless of
medium-term endogenous developments, appropriate structural policies,
in particular concerning the labour market, must be initiated.
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30 See OECD “labour market regulation indicator”: in 2002 the five major euro area countries
are ranked between 13
th (Netherlands) and 22
nd (Spain), the United States and the United Kingdom
are in first and second place respectively. (According to this indicator, countries with the least
restrictive labour laws rank highest).
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IN THE EVENT OFASYMMETRIC SHOCKS
Regarding fiscal policy, the establishment of Monetary Union was
accompanied by a very substantial strengthening of governance: the Stability
and Growth Pact and the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines.
I believe that the Stability and Growth Pact is an important element in the
construction of Economic and Monetary Union.
It satisfies the two questions that were most frequently asked at the outset of
Monetary Union, and which remain entirely topical:
– without a single fiscal policy, how can there be a balanced euro area-wide
policy mix?
– in the event of a shock affecting one particular economy, what would be
the contribution of the fiscal channel without a federal budget?
Indeed, we do not have a federal budget – the level of common resources,
standing at around 1% of GDP is clearly not tantamount to a federal budget
– but the Stability and Growth Pact makes it possible to keep national fiscal
policies balanced within adequate bounds of flexibility in order to preclude
any dysfunction of our Economic and Monetary Union.
Naturally, we can question the level at which the criteria established for the
euro area are set, such as the 3% of GDP budget deficit limit.
I have had the opportunity on numerous occasions to give my point of view
on this 3% limit, introduced in my country in the early 1980s – well before
the start of negotiations on the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth
Pact –, on the basis of a well thought-out analysis, according to which
unsustainable financial constraints cannot be passed on to future generations.
In the last part of your seminar, you discussed the theoretical analyses solidly
underpinning the principle of a fiscal pact in monetary union, so I will refrain
from repeating them. But simply allow me to recall that, irrespective of the
economy, because of rational expectations there is a level above which the
traditional Keynesian effects produced by an increase in public spending and
a rise in deficits are more than offset by what I would term Ricardian effects.
In other words, you lose more in terms of household and business confidence
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investment – than you gain in terms of “Keynesian spending”.
There are therefore limitations to any effective action and these limitations
must be subject to an economic assessment and, ultimately, to common sense.
In Europe, a 3% margin was chosen, as a margin of a 3% deficit vis-à-vis
a balanced budget is sufficient to withstand the vast majority of cyclical
downturns.
As regards the second criticism, that levelled at asymmetric shocks, we
consider, with the Stability and Growth Pact, that budgets must be balanced
or in surplus in normal times, in order to maintain essential reserves for
difficult periods. These stabilising reserves may be drawn on either in the
event of a slowdown affecting the area’s economy as a whole, or for national
budgets in the event of a shock impacting on a particular economy. As long
as the criteria of the Stability and Growth Pact are met, it is no longer
necessary for there to be a federal budget in order to have a consistent
“Economic and Monetary Union”.
It is worth stressing that the solution put forward in Europe includes a mutual
surveillance aspect, which goes far beyond the policy framework implemented
in mature federal organisations, such as the United States, Germany and
Switzerland. In the American states, the German Länder and the Swiss cantons,
fiscal decisions are taken in a more decentralised institutional framework
31.
In addition, the application of the principle of subsidiarity in fiscal matters
can promote the emergence and subsequently the generalisation of “good
practices”. This is an essential process which enables each State to take
greater advantage of its euro area membership.
To sum up, we absolutely need a device such as the Stability and Growth Pact,
because otherwise, we would be in a fundamentally unstable situation and the
criticisms formulated by the Eurosceptics in the 1990s relative to the
unlikelihood of the euro area’s viability, would be founded.
I would now like to make a few last comments derived from the fact that
a monetary union is an evolving organisation underpinned by endogenous
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endogeneity of monetary unions, and to the New Economic Geography
models in the wake of Paul Krugman’s work (1991).
III – STRUCTURAL POLICIES MUST PROMOTE ENDOGENOUS
FORCES TO STRENGTHEN THE EURO AREA
First comment: a monetary union is an evolving organisation
underpinned by endogenous dynamics.
Frankel and Rose show that the properties of a monetary union change over
time. Monetary union leads to an increase in trade flows between member
countries and a greater degree of trade openness (also vis-à-vis the rest of the
area), due to the elimination of exchange rate risk and the fall in transaction
and information costs. It is therefore expected to generate greater incentives
to further specialisation. Economic cycles, which are largely synchronised
between countries on account of the relative diversification of euro area
economies, could become more divergent. This movement could result in
a lower degree of optimality on this specific aspect.
How will this specialisation evolve in the future? The second half of the 20
th
century was characterised by the development of intra-sectoral specialisation,
reflecting, to alarge extent, companies’international expansion strategies. Indeed,
multinationals sought to raise their industrial efficiency through specialised
production sites, which would generate economies of scale. At the same time, their
choice of location was essentially determined by the need to be close to their
customers. National economies generally retained a relatively sectorally-
diversified productive structure, while benefiting from productivity gains.
However, this specialisation pattern could change for a number of reasons:
– the “proximity constraint”, which previously governed location choices, is
loosened on account of lower transaction costs resulting from monetary
union – as well as from economic union. At the same time, heightened
competition arising from greater market integration and better price
comparability, reinforces the “efficiency constraint” and the incentive to
develop economies of scale;
– in a high-tech economy, the unit value of investment projects tends to rise,
thereby increasing the necessity of taking advantage of an environment
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proximity of research institutes, and more generally, the proximity of all
of the services to be found in a complex economy.
These developments suggest that new location strategies are needed and the
host of studies on the “agglomeration effects” highlight a striking
phenomenon, which deserves to be given greater attention. While complete
specialisation is achieved when relative endowments of factors of production
are equalised, according to the classical theory of international trade, these
agglomeration effects are likely to amplify the concentration dynamics
32. We
should take this element into account when considering the future of EMU.
Second comment: the heightened specialisation and agglomeration
dynamics represent more an opportunity than a risk for the euro area.
If these changes take place progressively, Europe might evolve from being
a union of rather diversified economies to what would look like a union of
specialised regions. At the macroeconomic and monetary levels, economic
cycles may differ increasingly between regions. Regions that fail to attract
certain activities at the peak of their cycle could witness a decline of their tax
base, to the benefit of others. The gap between advanced sectors (which
benefit from economic convergence and the spread of knowledge) and
traditional sectors is likely to widen.
The concept of “region” used here does not mean that the concept of “State”
will become less relevant in the future, especially given the role played by
sovereign States, which still underpin the European construction process and
define economic policies. It seems more realistic to consider Europe as
a combination of two spheres, the first one reflecting the regional economic
geography and the second one the national political geography, the interaction
of which would influence the pattern of specialisation.
However, in terms of opportunities, increased specialisation would result in
productivity gains, and, consequently, in a higher growth potential.
Furthermore, the agglomeration dynamics would lead to the clustering of
diversified competencies. It might seem anachronistic, in the age of the
internet, that geographical proximity represents a clear advantage in terms of
spreading knowledge. Yet, this appears to be the case. In particular,
“accidental innovations” – innovations which stem from the accidental
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thus seems that developing a knowledge-based economy – one of the
objectives of the Lisbon Strategy – will inevitably lead to a strengthening of
these agglomeration dynamics.
Third comment: in addition to serving as automatic regulators,
structural policies have a major role to play and must, therefore, fit into
a European framework.
Of course, agglomeration effects are and will continue to be automatically
regulated. Indeed, in regions where such dynamics are at work, costs tend to
increase on account of real factors such as pressure on land prices and
transport infrastructure bottlenecks, thus enhancing the relative attractiveness
of other regions. If the latter are not able to rapidly expand their supply, their
window of opportunity might close. A vicious circle of economic
degeneration may then be set in motion.
Structural policies can facilitate this automatic regulation. This suggests that
we still have to make considerable efforts to improve the coordination of
economic policies within the euro area. Indeed, I believe that the single US
economic policy also accounts for the fact that specialisation in the United
States is widely accepted. In the euro area, the coordination of fiscal policies
and structural policies has not yet reached the optimum. This represents
a huge project in terms of strengthening the euro area. Although the Treaty
itself is not as explicit and exacting regarding structural policies as in the case
of Europe’s monetary, fiscal, competition and trade policies -which can
already be described as “federal” – we need to place greater emphasis on this
part of the economic sphere that covers all structural aspects. I here refer to
the labour markets, which are, in my opinion, a weak point as regards the euro
area’s optimality but which are bound to be a more crucial determinant of its
degree of optimality in the future.
*
*        *
I would like to draw three cautious conclusions from my previous
considerations:
● first, the structural changes that are likely to occur in the medium term will
lead businesses, banks, regional authorities and the State to develop new
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agglomeration effects. These strategic orientations will in return shape the
structural changes which I believe will be very profound.
● second, by setting a medium and long-term price stability objective, which
serves as an anchor for economic agents’price expectations, the monetary
policy conducted by the ECB Governing Council creates the appropriate
conditions for making rational economic choices, in the absence of
which strategies would lack substance. Economic policies, in particular,
are devised in a stable environment in the medium to long term, conducive
to entrepreneurial risk-taking and an optimal use of private and public
funds across a very large continental area. In this respect, I would like to
point out that the ECB’s recent clarification of its monetary policy has
highlighted that the euro area’s monetary policy is designed to solve
problems occurring over an 18 months-two year time horizon but also
those occurring over a medium-long term horizon.
● finally – and this remark is at the heart of today’s debate – economic and
monetary union is a dynamic concept – in the sense that it is underpinned
by continuous endogenous structural changes – and not a static one. It is
underpinned by profound long-term structural transformations: greater
division of labour in a large economy, agglomeration effects and
specialisation effects.
The progressive move of every euro area economy towards a possible lesser
diversification must gradually go hand in hand with stronger European
economic governance, and in particular, with ever closer coordination of
structural reform policies. These policies are already required in each
individual country, and even more so, for economic reasons, at the level of the
euro area and the EU as a whole, comprising 15 members today and 25 very
shortly.
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